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ARTICLE
“Don’t confuse me with facts”—how right wing
populism affects trust in agencies advocating
anthropogenic climate change as a reality
Olve Krange1✉, Bjørn P. Kaltenborn1 & Martin Hultman2
Everyday public denial of anthropogenically caused climate change (ACC) has
complex antecedents and exists on both individual and institutional levels. Earlier research
has linked ACC denial to opposition to formal science and elites, perceived threats to the
industrialist capitalist order and existing system properties. Research also suggest that trust
in public organizations is a key factor in determining support or opposition to climate change
policies. In this paper, we explore the possibility that right wing populism and anti-elitist
attitudes fuel both ACC denial and low trust in environmental institutions. We surveyed a
representative sample of Norwegians (N= 3032) to measure ACC denial, how denial is
linked to socio-demographic characteristics, trust in environmental institutions, attitudes
toward elites and immigration, as well as environmental attitude orientations. Results show
that lack of trust in environmental institutions is strongly associated with ACC denial, and
furthermore that the degree of trust—or lack thereof—is partly a function of anti-elitist
attitudes, opposition to migration and views of nature.
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C limate change (CC) has emerged as the foremost globalenvironmental issue during the last three decades. Lately,the widespread concern over CC is accompanied by an
equally grave and growing worry over landscape changes and
habitat loss as perhaps the most important driver of CC (Stod-
dard et al., 2021). Collectively, the climate crisis and the nature
crisis (Ruckelhaus et al., 2020) confront humanity with formid-
able challenges in terms of societal organization and political
leadership. However, even after the last IPPC report (Sixth
Assessment Report (ipcc.ch)) several political agents still refuse to
recognize human activities as the most important driver of global
warming, an undisputable fact in the IPCC reports. Often affili-
ated with right wing populist movements or parties they are
frequently also outspoken anti-immigration and anti-elitist
advocates, and do not hesitate to criticize scientists and scien-
tific knowledge in general (ref. e.g. Covid 19 anti-vax hesitancy
and organized aggression/Agius et al., 2020; Kallbekken and
Sælen, 2021).
Norway offers a particularly interesting context for the study of
ACC denial. On one hand Norway has an image as a green
country, a generous donor of foreign aid to promote peace and
sustainable development. On the other Norway’s economy is
strongly oil and gas-dependent, an industry which forms the
economic basis for one of the world’s most generous public
welfare systems. The Norwegian population of five million
emitted 7 tons of CO2 per capita per year in 2018. (CO2 emissions
(metric tons per capita)—Norway|Data (worldbank.org)), a
rather high value compared to world average (4.4 CO2 per capita/
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)|Data (worldbank.org)).
Many factors influence public opinions about and trust in science:
Affluent CO2-dependent lifestyles, strong scientific evidence for
anthropogenically induced climate change (ACC) and global
warming, a political elite surpassing the antagonism between oil
and gas extraction and CCA and huge revenues from oil and
affiliated industries (Listhaug, 2005; Thurber et al., 2011).
CC denial and underlying values are not restricted to populist
parties and may be labeled ‘mainstream populism’ or demoticism
(March, 2017). Agents of ACC skepticism, strict immigration
laws, anti-elitism and skepticism towards scientist and scientific
knowledge can be found across the political spectrum. However,
in Norway as in many other countries, this is more prevalent on
the right wing of the political spectrum. One political party in
particular not only is strongly skeptical of ACC and science in
general, but also voice strong support for continued oil-and gas
production, as well as a suite of other illiberal political positions.
This persistent and complex challenge of the combined climate
and nature crisis exposes science and research to public scrutiny.
The CC narrative has found its way into most political sectors
with significant impacts on policies, strategies and actions
affecting budgets and livelihoods of large populations. There is
broad consensus about anthropogenic climate change (ACC)
among scientists, and while a substantial part of the public is still
skeptical, significant portions of the public believe that CC is real,
that it is caused by human activity, and that collective political
action now needs to take place (Anderegg et al., 2010; Poortinga
et al., 2011; Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; Tranter and Booth,
2015). Recent data from the US show that 72 percent take as a
fact that global warming is happening, and 57 percent accept as
true that it is caused by humans (Yale Program on Climate
Change Communication, 2020). This mirrors the trends found in
a range of other countries. Across the globe, the portion of the
public who believes that humans have no hand in CC is con-
sistently <10 per cent (YouGov, 2019).
As with many other societal risks the complex nature of ACC
makes it hard for non-experts to assess and fully understand its
causes, risks, magnitudes and timeframes. CC impacts are often
psychologically—as well as physically distant, yet simultaneously
frightening to many, regardless of political orientation (Spence
et al., 2011; Marshall, 2014; Stoknes, 2015; Lindvall et al., 2020).
Also, some researchers have argued that the dominant CC dis-
courses which focus on technological fixes, neoclassic economical
solutions and changing the culture of consumption do not
necessarily advance social change since they represent particular
norms and value sets to which parts of the public do not subscribe
(Fleming et al., 2014). These dominant discourses emphasize lack
of information and science, as well as consumerism. They further
argue that the language used by different social groups is not
recognized by the dominant CC discourses. Hence lay people are
not accepted as legitimate producers of knowledge (Fleming et al.,
2014), which may alienate certain groups and compound the
resistance against elites and established institutions.
Distrust in climate science results has increasingly become an
ideology marker, a position taken by default if you consider
yourself a right-wing or conservative voter (McCright et al., 2016;
Sheldon and Oreskes, 2017; Lockwood, 2018; Hultman, 2020;
Graça, 2021). However, these kinds of analysis need to be
nuanced (Huber, 2020; Vihma et al., 2021). Some groups in
society strive to defend the industrialist capitalist order from the
claims of environmental groups, and therefore doubt or reject all
social and natural science that underpins issues like CC. Para-
doxically, at least in terms of belief in science as a mode of
knowledge production, the same groups support and believe in
science that provides instruments for economic production
(McCright et al., 2013; Forchtner et al., 2018).
Trust plays a critical role in communicating science to the
public. Whether or not people trust organizations and individuals
that communicate ACC is a critical condition in terms of support
and opposition to the CC narrative (Marshall, 2014). Here we
understand trust as an attitude, a form of openness to new
knowledge and intentions by persons, social groups or institu-
tions. Or in the words of Earle et al. (2010), a “willingness, in
expectation of beneficial outcomes, to make oneself vulnerable to
another based on a judgment of similarity of intentions or
values”. Trust can also be understood as a form of power
exchange where one allows someone else “the benefit of the
doubt” (Rahn and Transue, 1998), by accepting alternative
information and its potential implications. A typical trait of the
CC discourse is that most people typically have little knowledge of
the complex scientific foundation for the ACC claim. As several
authors have argued, trust can be seen as a form of ‘standing
decision’ which provides a heuristic for evaluating conflicting
scientific claims about the environment (Bord et al., 2000; Smith,
2002; Shwom et al., 2008). Trust helps alleviating uncertainty and
improves the efficiency of information processing (Nyhan, 2000;
Brewer and Ley, 2013).
In this paper, we aim for a deeper understanding of the rela-
tionship between ACC denial and trust in climate science—
examining the relationship in the context of right wing populism
and anti-elitism.
Populism (right wing) and CC denial. Populism is a fuzzy term.
Our contribution is not on populism per se and we use the term
populism rather loosely to denote popular opposition towards an
illegitimate elite. In Western European countries populism has
typically been associated with radical right wing parties. However,
left as well as right leaning parties can utilize the idea that
‘ordinary good people are ruled and exploited by an illegitimate
corrupt elite’ (paraphrasing Mudde, 2004) as core message in
their effort to recruit voters. For instance, based on an analyses of
32 parties in five European countries Rooduijn and Akkerman
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(2017) found that parties from both ends of the political spectrum
employed people-centered ant-elitist populist discourses in their
communication. Similar findings are made in the UK (Gandesha,
2018).
Originally a phenomenon on the political fringes for a long
time after the second world war, authoritarian nationalist parties
now, in 2021 attract large groups of voters in an increasing
number of countries. These parties have redrawn the political
map around Europe, and they sail under different flags. Some of
them—such as the National Assembly and the Sweden Democrats
—have their roots in fascist and neo-Nazi circles. Parties such as
the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party in Norway have
above all grown out of dissatisfaction with tax policy. Later, they
have moved to highlight their criticism of immigration policy,
thereby merging with other similar parties. Mudde uses the term
populist radical right, which he defines as nationalist, authoritar-
ian and anti-elite. It is important to point out, as Mudde does,
that it is a right-wing movement, as the populism that has
emerged on the left, such as Podemos in Spain, Bernie Sanders in
the United States or Jeremy Corbyn in Britain, has not had a
climate-denying, xenophobic, or authoritarian appearance
(Mudde, 2021).
A populist communication strategy is visible across the
spectrum revolving around a juxtaposition of ‘pure people’ versus
an ‘evil’, corrupt elite. (Huber et al., 2021). The populist far right
seemingly believes that such an elite is responsible for the loss of
economic competitiveness and hardship for individual members
of the nation. The stretch is short from this outlook to it’s the
influence of right wing populism on CC skepticism, arguing that
populist, anti-elite stances are driving climate skepticism. That is,
populism in general is bad for the climate, irrespective of its host
ideology, be it left or right (Huber, 2020). Populist elements are
certainly present in far-right climate communication, others have
convincingly shown that CC denial is most strongly predicted by
exclusionary, anti-egalitarian preferences and nationalist attitudes
which illustrates the significance of political ideology in relation
to climate policy discourse and action (Jylhä and Hellmer, 2020;
Kulin et al., 2021; Yan et al., 2021).
Research has shown that CC skepticism comes in a well-
organized and well-funded versions (e.g. the denial machine), as
lay peoples skepticism and as forms of ideology (McCright and
Dunlap, 2011; Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; Tranter and Booth,
2015; Hultman et al., 2019). All levels of public resistance
represent important barriers towards successful CC adaption and
mitigation policies. Our assumption is that the trust in
environmental organizations vary across the public in the sense
defined by (Renn and Levine, 1991) that there are diverse views
on whether the message in the CC discourse is true and reliable
and that the communicating agencies demonstrate competence
and honesty by conveying accurate, objective and complete
information.
In this paper, we build on earlier research exploring the
foundations of resistance against acknowledging and accepting
ACC, which has shown that skepticism and denial can be linked
to antecedents like early life socialization and cultural capital (e.g.
Kaltenborn et al., 2017), protection of group identity and social
systems providing desired benefits, as well as anti-elitism (e.g.
McCright and Dunlap, 2011), lack of trust in formal science and
institutions (e.g. Lacey et al., 2018; Smith and Mayer, 2018), and
right wing populism and xenophobia (e.g. Forchtner, 2019; Jylhä
et al., 2020; Malm, 2021).
Populist and extreme right wing movements tend to challenge
the developments and changes proposed by more liberal forces
and established institutions (Rydgren, 2005). In many cases, the
very core of the mission of populist movements is the opposition
to formal governance and scientific knowledge. We suggest in the
context of CC that as an opposition movement, populism and
extreme right wing groups express what they perceive as relative
deprivation of societal goods compared to other groups, since
they perceive that their way of life may be threatened if liberal
forces succeed with their CC policies, arguing that it is not
economic hardship or deprivation as such but the internalized
fear of losing one’s social status that makes people more prone to
support populist ideas and parties (Lübke, 2021).
We also assume that the denial of ACC does not necessarily
limit itself to a narrow battle over the dominant scientific truth
that ACC is real. We suspect that as CC skepticism is woven into
the fabric of a broader scope of resistance, therefore trust in
established public institutions with responsibility for questions of
environmental governance is a critical variable. Given the
somewhat obscure and diffuse nature of CC impacts, most
people are left to rest their opinions in the trust they have for
experts and the various institutions that communicate ACC and
implement actions that will affect our everyday life in the future.
And this narrative is continually challenged by alternative
“experts” claiming contradictory truths (Lamb et al., 2020).
The link between CC denial and xenophobic attitudes is well
established within the international research literature (e.g.
Forchtner and Kølvraa, 2015; Lockwood, 2018; Krange et al.,
2018; Hultman et al., 2019; Hultman, 2020). The explanations
vary a great deal, but many emphasize the fact that both measures
to mitigate CC and immigration drive changes that affect
different parts of the public to various degrees. The growing
influence of the digitally based far-right media also appears to be
a driving factor in Europe (Vowles and Hultman, 2021) a similar
pattern as happened in the US some years before (Bloomfield and
Tillery, 2019: Kaiser et al., 2020).
Xenophobic attitudes and opposition to immigration have been
linked to the concept of relative deprivation, the idea that
individuals or groups experience what they perceive as injustice
(Walker et al., 2015). This is a sense of grievance about injustice
or being marginalized in a way that is unfair, where one ends up
worse than comparison groups. Multiculturalism and pluralist
ideologies can threaten identity and ethnicity, and exacerbate in-
and out group distinctions (Pulé and Hultman, 2019). Anger and
resentment from perceived deprivation can lead to social protest
and resistance (Anshelm and Hultman, 2014; Daggett, 2018;
Leviston et al., 2020). The concept is usually applied in contexts
where individuals or groups can assess the fairness of an outcome
relative to an imaginable outcome (Walker et al., 2015).
Outcomes are typically distributive, for instance how will CC
mitigation policies affect the access to non-renewable natural
resources. Of relevance here is that both CC, immigration and
established elites may all be perceived as proxies of the political
majority, potentially threatening the existing social and political
order in a way that can lead to relative deprivation of populist and
right wing movements.
To examine these assumptions, we specifically ask what is the
extent of CC denial among the Norwegian public, and how is CC
denial linked to socio-demographic characteristics, trust in
environmental institutions, attitudes toward elites and immigra-
tion, as well as environmental attitude orientations.
Methods and data collection
3032 Norwegians, aged 18–80, completed an online questionnaire
in 2017 asking multiple questions about the environment and CC.
Respondents were drawn from a nationally representative panel
(TNS Gallup-panel) of 50,000 persons. Approximately 7704
respondents were contacted, leaving us with a 39 per cent
response rate. The questionnaire was self-administered through
an Internet solution. Respondents were called one extra time and
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the link was closed when target sample size was reached.
Therefore, the response rate would have been higher if everyone
who wanted to answer had been given the opportunity. An
advantage of this procedure, however, is that sampling correc-
tions can be made during the course of data collection if dis-
proportions are observed. Our sample was stratified according to
official Norwegian statistics, using age, sex, geography and level of
education as stratification variables.1
To cover both trend and attribution skepticism to CC we
asked: Which of the following three statements do you personally
believe? ‘Climate change is happening now, caused mainly by
human activities’, ‘climate change is happening now, but caused
mainly by natural forces’, ‘climate change is not happening now’
and unsure/don’t have an opinion. In the following analyses we
combine both trend and attribution skepticisms, where respon-
dents who are either trend or attribution skeptics simply are
called CC skeptics. We compare this group with the respondents
who stated that they believe in anthropogenic CC (ACC), the
non-skeptics. Respondents that did not fit into any of these
categories (missing and the unsure) where removed from the
sample. Leaving us with a net sample size of n= 2834.
Table 1 provides the coding, mean and standard deviation for
all the variables in the study.
We measured trust in expert knowledge as confidence in a set
of agents and environmental institutions that represents the ACC
scientific consensus. We asked: “What is your level of trust in the
agents and institutions listed below?” Level of trust was indicated
on a 5-point scale ranging from “very low trust” to “very high
trust”. We created the index “Trust in environmental institutions”
based on responses to five institutions from the list: climate sci-
entists, biologists, Norwegian Environment Agency, Ministry of
Climate and Environment, and Friends of the earth (Norway).
The index achieved a Cronbach’s Alpha equal to 0.87. Socio-
demographic characteristics included gender, age, education level,
income status and place of residence size (rural–urban).
The questionnaire contained statements aimed to measure the
respondents’ overall views on nature. Here we have selected three
formulations. On a five-point scale, respondents agreed or dis-
agreed with the following statements: “Nature’s balance is fragile
and can be easily disturbed by human activities”, “I think it is
right that the intrinsic value of nature is one of the pillars in
Norwegian conservation legislation” and “The idea that nature
has intrinsic value is wrong.” We constructed an index we call
ecocentric view of nature that ranges from 0 to 4. Agreement with
ecocentrism increases with increasing score. The scale achieved a
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.66.
In Norway, as in many other western countries, loud and
outspoken criticism of massive immigration, is characteristic of
right leaning populist rhetoric. Respondents were asked to
respond to the statement ‘We have enough immigrants and
asylum seekers in our country’. Level of agreement was reported
on a five-point scale ranging from disagree strongly to agree
strongly.
We operationalized “anti-elitism” by constructing an index
based on the level of agreement with five statements: “The elites
(within politics, management, business, etc.) determine the
development of society at the expense of the minds of ordinary
people”, “Politicians are mostly concerned with securing their
own interests”, “ Experts decide too much”, “Ordinary people are
more honest than politicians” and “Lay knowledge is more sound
than education”. On all items respondents gave their opinion on a
five point scale ranging from disagree completely to agree com-
pletely. The scale achieved a Cronbachs Alpha equal to 0.81.
Results
Figure 1 shows that CC skepticism is still quite widespread in
Norway, despite the overwhelming scientific evidence provided
by IPPC over many years, and the extensive coverage of CC issues
in media on all levels form the local to international coverage.
The level of CC denial in the Norwegian public appears to have
remained relatively stable for several years. In the current study,
attribution skepticism counted for most the CC denial. More than
36 percent reported that they believed in CC but disagreed that
human activities was the main cause. Trend skepticism on the
other hand is very rare. Only 1.6 percent believe that CC does not
happen at all. In a previous study of CC denial among Norwe-
gians based on date from 2012, we found that 36 percent dis-
agreed that CC is caused by humans, but a mere 1.1 per cent of
the population totally rejected the existence of CC as a phe-
nomenon (Krange et al., 2018).
The joint dichotomized ACC denial measure (Table 1) shows
that 41 percent were either attribution or trend skeptics. How-
ever, note that the phrase “mainly caused by”, since respondents
who belong to this group do not necessarily totally reject the
influence of human activities, but see it as less important than
Table 1 Coding, mean and standard deviation for variables in the study.
Variable Coding Mean SD
Climate change skeptics 0 (believe in ACC) to 1 (trend and attribution skeptics) 0.41 0.49
Trust in environmental institutions 0 (very low trust) to 4 (very high trust) 2.33 0.85
Gender 0 (female) to 1 (male) 0.50 0.50
Age 18–80+ (numbers inn actual years) 49.44 16.44
Educational attainment 0 (secondary school or less) to 3 (university 4 years+) 1.29 0.77
Annual income in NOK 1 (<200k) to 9 (more than 1000k) 3.59 2.05
Place of residence (rural–urban) 0 (<200) to 6 (>300,000) 3.19 1.74
Immigrant skepticism 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly) 2.47 1.24
Egocentric view of nature 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly) 2.93 0.74
Anti-elitism 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly) 2.60 0.84
Fig. 1 Univariate prevalence. Which of the following three statements do
you personally believe? N= 3023 (percent).
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“natural causes”. So, we can ascertain that even after several
decades of scientific research confirming human impact on CC
and a very high degree of scientific consensus on the relationship
between e.g. CO2 emissions and global warming, a substantial
portion of Norwegians still disagrees with the overwhelming
scientific consensus on the topic. Table 2 shows how CC skep-
ticism correlates with trust and a range in socio-economic vari-
ables using bi-variate linear regression analyses (OLS). In this
analysis CC denial is the dependent variable, where the effect of
each of the independent variables are tested separately.
CC denial is clearly associated with a lack of trust in envir-
onmental institutions. As noted above, CC is a diffuse and
complex phenomenon, seldom directly observable on an everyday
life experience level. The causes and drivers of CC are even less
tangible. Therefore, whether one believes in anthropogenically
caused CC is a question of trust in formal science and established
public institutions. The agents and institutions we have included
in this study all communicate a coherent narrative that ACC has
been confirmed beyond doubt and that society must take drastic
action in order to avoid grave future consequences. Hence, the
observed negative statistical association is as expected. However,
these are also agencies with multiple responsibilities and interests
in environmental issues, and consequently varying degree of
influence on nature management policies. Because environmental
regulations impact people’s everyday life in any number of ways,
there are several potential reasons to distrust them, and it is
perfectly possible to combine lack of trust with the belief that
ACC is a reality. But the strong effect from (B=−1.35) and the
OR at 0.26 suggests that this combination is not particularly
prevalent.
The analyses indicate that CC skepticism is far more wide-
spread among men than women. In general, survey research find
that CC denial and skepticism is gendered, but the methods used
often only provide aggregate data about men and women.
One of the more striking examples is the so called “with male
effects”, a term used by McCright and Dunlap (2011). They
reported that within elite groups conservative males were heavily
overrepresented, suggesting that this was an expression of pro-
tecting group identity and justifying a societal system that pro-
vides desired benefits. Actions needed to mitigate the effects of
CC requires social and economic change that threatens the
groups that benefit from the existing social order, and it seems
that this type of resistance is most strongly expressed by white,
conservative men. Similar findings have been reported by us
among Norwegians (Krange et al., 2018) and is more or less a
global phenomenon as summarized in the term Industrial/
Breadwinner masculinities by Hultman and Pulé (2018). We also
find statistically significant correlations between CC skepticism
and all the other variables we included. The bivariate regression
analysis indicates that the CC issue is heavily polarizing, with
strong effects from other attitude variables, such as trust in
environmental institutions, view of nature, skepticism towards
immigrants, and anti-elitism, in addition to social variables such
as educational attainment, gender, age and educational attain-
ment. CC denial is positively correlated with lack of trust in
environmental institutions, it increases with age, but it is nega-
tively correlated with education, i.e. the higher the level of edu-
cation, the less likely a person is to be skeptical to, or deny ACC.
Furthermore, CC denial is positively correlated with opposition to
elites and immigration, and a CC denier is more likely to live in a
rural setting than an urban context. Views of nature also dis-
criminates significantly, i.e. the more ecocentric attitudes a person
expresses, the less likely he or she is to be CC denier.
We then performed a multiple regression analysis with four
consecutive models on the same data set, again with CC denial as
the dependent variable (Table 3). In this procedure the inde-
pendent variables are entered stepwise so that we can observe
how the contribution of each set of independent variables impacts
the effect from the trust in environmental institutions variable. In
the first model we entered only the ‘Trust in environmental
institutions’ variable which produced a significant correlation
with CC denial. The second model contained trust, gender, age,
education, income and place of residence. In this model, the
contribution of gender is not significant, but all the other inde-
pendent variables influence the level of CC denial significantly.
We also see that the effect of trust is slightly reduced as this
variable is also influenced by other variables. In the third model
we added the ‘Ecocentrism’ variable, which has a marked effect
on the overall relationship. The effect of trust is still significant
but is reduced compared to the second model. In the fourth
model we added the remaining variables, ‘Immigrant skepticism’,
Table 2 Bivariate logistic regressions (OLS).
Dependent variable: Climate change
skeptics
B SE Sig. OR
Variables: Trust in environmental
institutions
−1.35 0.06 0.000 0.26
Gender 0.55 0.07 0.000 1.74
Age 0.02 0.00 0.000 1.02
Educational attainment −0.50 0.06 0.000 0.61
Annual income in NOK 0.07 0.08 0.000 1.08
Place of residence (rural–urban) −0.20 0.02 0.000 0.82
Ecocentric view of nature −1.56 0.07 0.000 0.21
Immigrant skepticism 0.54 0.04 0.000 1.71
Anti-elitism 0.89 0.05 0.000 2.044
Table 3 Multippel logistic regressions (OLS).
Dependent variable: Climate change skeptics Model 1 B/SE/Sig. Model 2 B/SE/Sig. Model 3 B/SE/Sig. Model 4 B/SE/Sig.
Variables: Trust in environmental institutions −1.35 (0.6)*** −1.25 (0.07)*** −0.93 (0.07)*** −0.84 (0.08)***
Gender 0.05 (0.11)ns 0.02 (0.11)ns 0.04 (0.11)ns
Age 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.00)***
Educational attainment −0.36 (0.07)*** −0.25 (0.08)** −0.19 (0.08)*
Annual income in NOK 0.10 (0.03)*** 0.10 (0.03)** 0.09 (0.03)**
Place of residence (rural–urban) −0.07 (0.03)* −0.08 (0.03)* −0.08 (0.03)*
Ecocentric view of nature −1.12 (0.08)*** −1.10 (0.09)***
Immigrant skepticism 0.21 (0.05)***
Anti-elitism 0.33 (0.08)***
Constant 1.94 (0.26)*** 4.36 (34)*** 2.32 (44)***
ns not significant, *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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and ‘Anti-elitism’ which also prove to have significant effects on
the prediction of CC denial, but the effect of trust is further
reduced.
The analysis reveals several interesting findings. First, of all the
independent variables included, gender is the only variable that
does not correlate significantly with CC denial. Controlled for
“trust in environmental institutions” gender have no impact as a
predictor for the level of denial, and this holds for all four models
of multiple regression. Second, CC denial forms statistically sig-
nificant correlations with the other factors. Age, education,
income and type of residence have some predictive power, and so
do the attitude factors, trust in environmental organizations,
views of nature, and skepticism towards immigration and elites.
Trust in environmental organizations have significant predictive
power in all four models. However, the analysis also shows that
when more variables are added to the equation, and in particular
ecocentrism, immigration skepticisms, and anti-elitism, the effect
of trust is reduced. In other words, the level of trust in envir-
onmental institutions is to a considerable extent embedded in
attitudes the respondents hold toward nature in general, elites,
and immigration.
Discussion
To deny anthropogenic CC comprise rejection of what influential
institutions like the IPCC and Norwegian environmental insti-
tutions consider a fact. Nevertheless, CC skepticism and denial of
this kind is still relatively widespread among the Norwegian
public and appears to have remained at a stable level during the
past few years. Based on a study of rural communities in Norway,
Norgaard (2011) showed how denial was produced and main-
tained on a national and local level. She observed a contradiction
between beliefs and action concerning CC, and coined the term
“socially organized denial” to explain how local actors such as
politicians, newspapers and even teachers help communities find
a way to overcome otherwise unpleasant antagonisms, for
instance by obfuscating danger by endorsing technical solutions.
Similar contradictions and negotiations are currently played
out on the national level. Representatives of the largest and most
influential political parties, including members of government,
maintain that Norwegian oil and gas production is “part of the
climate solution” (Norsk sokkel—en del av løsningen—regjer-
ingen.no). They claim that emissions from burning fossil fuel
extracted on the Norwegian shelf is minor compared to other
sources, such as polish brown coal (lignite) which use otherwise
would increase. Hence, it is argued that Norwegian oil and gas
extraction is not only beneficial to Norwegian economy, but also
to global warming. More than ever, the ruling political elites are
intensely preoccupied with trying to persuade the public that
Norwegian climate policy is on a climate friendly track.
This study shows that denial of ACC is clearly associated with a
lack of trust in environmental institutions. This is noteworthy as
these professionals and institutions carry much of the responsi-
bility for developing policies and implementing actions aimed at
mitigating the impacts of CC. Environmental institutions and
their staff produce and maintain a CC discourse that, as we have
alluded to above, can appear as alienating and excluding to seg-
ments of the public who do not believe in the language often used
at the science–policy interface, and who may hold other value sets
and alternative beliefs about environmental processes.
As a response to lack of trust, it may seem logical to try to
increase the legitimacy of such institutions through further
emphasis on increased information, the role they play for the
benefit of society, the graveness of the CC phenomenon and so
on. However, this risks simply compounding part of the reason
many people do not believe in or trust these institutions. Namely
that environmental organizations represent instruments of power
for a type of societal change that could lead to what certain
groups perceive as relative depredation and loss of desired system
properties and benefits (Stoddard et al., 2021). If current insti-
tutions enforce policies leading to societal change which is per-
ceived as unjust and unfair, scientific evidence will not improve
the legitimacy of their agenda (Newell et al., 2020).
All societal change creates new differences and changes in
power balances. Aversion towards change in power positions has
in previous research been connected to an ‘identity-protection’
behavior attracting older males to CC denial positions (e.g.
Krange et al., 2018), but is not identified in the same way when
trust is added as a factor. This difference might be interpreted as
either another form of ‘identity-protection’ practice this time by
women, or that we are currently dealing with a much broader
ideological turn towards CC denial (Forchtner et al., 2018).
Research in Sweden indicates that the commonality is exclu-
sionary and anti‐egalitarian preferences, conservative values, and
antiestablishment attitudes as well as an anti-feminist standpoint
connected to CC denial, but little connection to the men and
women binary (Jylhä and Hellmer, 2020).
In parallel with the change required to mitigate global warming
several other historical changes are prevalent these days, which
also challenge people’s ways of living and require individual-level
changes and adaptations. Many populist movements have been
fueled by the implications of CC the way they are framed by the
majority political power (Huber, 2020). The increasing pressure
to scale down and restructure sectors and industries causing
unacceptable climate gas emissions will inevitably change many
people’s lifestyles. Another driver of societal and cultural change
is the significant immigration of both refugees and people who,
for other reasons, make it to the west (McCright and Dunlap,
2011; Krange et al., 2018). Such developments characterize socio-
democratic societies like Norway and are examples of phenomena
that affect many people and receive great political attention and
media coverage. These phenomena’ are experienced by and
challenge segments of the population differently.
While lack of trust in key organizations is an important finding
by itself, we maintain that it is urgent to understand what other
factors link to lack of trust, since trust in science can be influ-
enced by political ideology, religion, cultural capital, and various
socio-economic and socio-demographic factors (Brewer and Ley,
2013; McCright et al., 2013, 2016; Kaltenborn et al., 2017). In our
analysis we observed that the effect of trust in environmental
institutions was clearly reduced when we included the “ecocentric
view of nature-variable” in the analysis (Boukala and Tountasaki,
2019). In other words, there is a clear statistical association
between these views. Furthermore, we saw that immigrant
skepticism also had a clear impact on trust. When we controlled
for several other variables, the analysis further showed that atti-
tudinal factors had stronger relationships with trust in organi-
zations than sociodemographic factors. Other research have also
shown that political factors are more important in explaining
attitudes toward CC than sociodemographic variables (Hornsey
et al., 2016; Beiser-McGrath and Huber, 2018).
We suspect that there might be a common latent variable
behind lack of trust in public institutions that expresses more
general resistance to change and potentially different distributions
of contemporary societal benefits. Both opposition to modern
environmentalism and anti-immigration attitudes carry elements
of nostalgia, a yearning for “the good old days” (Vowles and
Hultman, 2021). The former is the antithesis to the idea that
nature has value in its own right, namely that nature is there to be
used by people—“the old way “of looking at things (nature), a
viewpoint associated with traditional ways of interacting with
nature. The latter can be interpreted as an expression of yearning
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for society as it used to be in previous times—a country for
Norwegians only, which is the basis for much right-wing political
messaging today regarding the environment in France (Boukala
and Tountasaki, 2019) and Denmark (Forchtner and Kølvraa,
2015) for example.
Betz and Johnson (2004) conclude that the higher objective of a
nostalgic political ambition is to stop or reverse the social erosion
that characterizes Western European liberal democracies. Similar
observations have been made in Sweden (Elgenius and Rysgren,
2019) and have also been identified as a common feature of Brexit
and Trump’s election victory in the US (Kenny, 2017), aptly
captured in the slogan Make America Great Again. A concurrent
retrospective longing can also be said to apply to the ecocentric
natural vision, a relatively new attraction of nature and an ethical
framework that stands in sharp contrast to the traditional,
instrumentally oriented exploitation of the nature and natural
resources (Skogen et al., 2017).
Collectively, the breadth of research on CC skepticism and
denial, resting on data from a range of contexts and cultures,
suggests that the unwillingness to accept the human hand in CC
may be part of a larger and perhaps higher order of resistance
towards change and uncertainty about future livelihoods and the
unknown. A possible interpretation is that some groups feel, or
fear, a relative deprivation of benefits if major social (Wullenkord
and Reese, 2021), political and economic conditions change as a
response to a worsening environment through CC. The denial of
CC change tends to be most strongly expressed in segments of the
public with a conservative and right wing populist political
orientation (Huber, 2020). These segments also tend to have
stronger anti-elitist orientations, lack of confidence in science and
low trust in environmental institutions (Mede and Schäfer, 2020),
which represent the society’s main instruments for mitigating CC
impacts.
Conclusion
Trust in environmental organizations is affected by a range of
factors including socio-demographic characteristics, ecocentric
views of nature, and attitudes toward elites and immigration. We
believe that the lack of trust in environmental organizations
associate with right wing and populist attitudes in two important
ways. First, environmental organizations are key instruments in
mitigating the effects of CC and this challenges contemporary
societal system properties, and is perceived by groups of con-
servatives as liberal elites forcing a type of relative deprivation
upon conservatives.
Second, environmental organizations rest their mission and
narrative on formal science. Both populist leaders and certain
conservative public segments nourish rejection of scientific
knowledge as the core of their respective beliefs and narratives,
albeit in rather different forms. Public distrust in formal science
has grown considerably during the last few decades as alternative
forms of knowledge compete for attention and legitimacy (Ari-
moto and Sato, 2012; Ravetz and Saltelli, 2015). The reasons are
complex and relate both to rivaling political agendas, as the
perceived inability of governing institutions to solve major soci-
etal issues and anti-elitism and ant-intellectualism (Merkley,
2020). Lack of trust in science has evolved on multiple levels from
special interest groups and lay people to right wing governments
to the extent of institutionalized ‘war on science’ (Mooney, 2005;
Mede and Schäfer, 2020). Institutionalized, everyday denial, may
also play a role (Thøgersen et al., 2021).
While the CC denial machine is well-funded and set up to
produce “counter truths”, lay skepticism constitutes the level
where such “counter truths” are received, supported and given
legitimacy. Hence, lay peoples’ CC denial is, at least partly, a
question of whom to trust in these matters. Trust is very much
connected to sources of information of lately digital ones seems to
be of great importance (Shah et al., 2021; Vowels and Hulman,
2021). This becomes a two-way relationship: Organized disin-
formation manufactures uncertainty. It helps generate skepticism
among laypeople and therefore also among politicians that see
denialists as important segments of their electorate and opposi-
tion towards liberals in power. This phenomenon is not restricted
to the CC realm, but has been identified across multiple envir-
onmental arenas, where the production and propagation of sci-
entific uncertainty has been used purposely by illiberal actors to
question the legitimacy of progressive social and environmental
reform (Oreskes and Conway, 2010).
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